by Don Park
at 2005/02/10 02:31:22
North Korea announced that it has nuclear weapons. While this is hardly news, public announcement makes it important. As I mentioned in a Dave Winer's morning coffee podcast (can't find the link just now but, fyi, it was recorded during a NDA-covered event at Microsoft ;-p), I don't think North Korean regime has any intentions to give up it's nuclear weapons nor shutdown it's nuclear programs. I believe they see the six-nation talk only as a way to buy time and gain resources while the talk is going on.
Serious military and economic confrontations with China lie in the path to nuclear weapon free Korean peninsula. The biggest ball in those confrontations, economy, will also be the best card to play in a game of who has more to lose: China or US.
IMHO, the best strategy is for Bush to not only talk about possibility of direct military actions but also sharply escalate war talks, enough to make economic losses seem as real as the sunrise tommorrow. In simpler terms, Bush has to bluff seriously to force China to throw away the hand: North Korea. Then he has to blockade North Korea, with China's cooperation, until North Korea implodes. Lots of sacrifices will be needed, but I think this is the best although not the most wishful solution.
Comments
Not only did North Korea state without any room for error that they indeed have nuclear weapons, they have abruptly ceased any discussion of disarmament.
This scares the absolute bejezus out of me.
This scares the absolute bejezus out of me.
While I think you have a very good reason to be scared, NK don't have sufficient launch capability yet. A few more years, Silicon Valley will be a juicy target for Mr. Bad Haircut who fancy himself as a movie director. I just hope 'going out with a bang' is not his favorite movie ending.
Don,
Korea is your home turf, but I beg to differ with the military solution. The real threat is nukes to terrorist countries like Iran, or to groups like Al Queda.
Let's look at the chessboard a bit. NK wants direct US talks and probably knows that any type of outward attack against SK or Japan will result in a devastating war it cannot win. It takes fuel, food, and ammo to run a war and neither Russia or China are willing to fund any war at this point.
These facts alone preclude war as a goal for the NK or as solution to the crisis.
The best way to resolve the NK crisis is to provide NK with both a predictable public outcome that tends to strengthen the second tier of NK leadership while diminishing the influence of the top leadership.
Examples,
(a) Open up NK. Propose friendship, even a US visit in time, after the NK leadership agrees to disarmament, inspections and decommission of its missiles within the framework of six-party talks.
(b) Recall all possibility of talks while there is war rethoric.
(c) Hold out the carrot of humanitarian aid.
(d) Exchange doctors allowing Chinese and SK doctors to visit and practice in NK while NK medical staff visits SK, Europe and US.
Over a 5 or 10 year span, this opening has to have serious repercussions on NK society, as openings to both China and Russia have had major impacts on their leadership.
Mike
Korea is your home turf, but I beg to differ with the military solution. The real threat is nukes to terrorist countries like Iran, or to groups like Al Queda.
Let's look at the chessboard a bit. NK wants direct US talks and probably knows that any type of outward attack against SK or Japan will result in a devastating war it cannot win. It takes fuel, food, and ammo to run a war and neither Russia or China are willing to fund any war at this point.
These facts alone preclude war as a goal for the NK or as solution to the crisis.
The best way to resolve the NK crisis is to provide NK with both a predictable public outcome that tends to strengthen the second tier of NK leadership while diminishing the influence of the top leadership.
Examples,
(a) Open up NK. Propose friendship, even a US visit in time, after the NK leadership agrees to disarmament, inspections and decommission of its missiles within the framework of six-party talks.
(b) Recall all possibility of talks while there is war rethoric.
(c) Hold out the carrot of humanitarian aid.
(d) Exchange doctors allowing Chinese and SK doctors to visit and practice in NK while NK medical staff visits SK, Europe and US.
Over a 5 or 10 year span, this opening has to have serious repercussions on NK society, as openings to both China and Russia have had major impacts on their leadership.
Mike
I agree with Mike that Russian or Chinese help for NK in the event of war is not in the cards. However, I suspect that this is probably going to turn out to be irrelevant in any case. The two big factors at work in a war (these have been the two big factors for some time):
1. The Nks can hit major SK populations centers in the sort of way that will lead to mass casualties (probably almost unprecedented civilian casualties).
2. From the military standpoint, that is a very, very short run thing. (Though the emotional and physical horror of such an event would likely be part of the Korean consciousness for a long time.) The NKs simply cannot overcome the airpower advantage of the US. Even in the pretty short run, we'll have them on their heels, no matter what kind of help the get. I guarantee it.
However, what really scares me, beyond the issue of the Korean peninsula itself, is the possibility that these bastards will sell these weapons or critical components to *anyone* (when Clinton talks about the NK threat, this is the point he continues to return to). There is already evidence (eg in the newly cooperative Libya) that this has happened. Any thoughts on how to stop that under either (or any) approach?
Peter
1. The Nks can hit major SK populations centers in the sort of way that will lead to mass casualties (probably almost unprecedented civilian casualties).
2. From the military standpoint, that is a very, very short run thing. (Though the emotional and physical horror of such an event would likely be part of the Korean consciousness for a long time.) The NKs simply cannot overcome the airpower advantage of the US. Even in the pretty short run, we'll have them on their heels, no matter what kind of help the get. I guarantee it.
However, what really scares me, beyond the issue of the Korean peninsula itself, is the possibility that these bastards will sell these weapons or critical components to *anyone* (when Clinton talks about the NK threat, this is the point he continues to return to). There is already evidence (eg in the newly cooperative Libya) that this has happened. Any thoughts on how to stop that under either (or any) approach?
Peter
Peter, I agree that #1 is likely to happen in the event of war. #2 would also be true if NK is on the offensive. But, I think NK will last a long time if they are on the defensive.
Control of the air means little unless they can destroy the huge underground network of tunnels dug over the past 50 years. I heard they even laid train tracks underground to move supplies. Those supply tunnels must first be located and destroyed using bunker busters. Then ground troops can move in to starve out each nest of tunnels. How long will it take? It's anyone's guess. Hopefully, morals of isolated NK troops holed up underground will crumble fast.
NK is definitely not Iraq and casualty numbers could easily top that of the last Korean War.
Control of the air means little unless they can destroy the huge underground network of tunnels dug over the past 50 years. I heard they even laid train tracks underground to move supplies. Those supply tunnels must first be located and destroyed using bunker busters. Then ground troops can move in to starve out each nest of tunnels. How long will it take? It's anyone's guess. Hopefully, morals of isolated NK troops holed up underground will crumble fast.
NK is definitely not Iraq and casualty numbers could easily top that of the last Korean War.
Don,
I've read a bit about those tunnels. They are pretty amazing.
Nonetheless, I think that a purely defensive war for NK is unlikely: if a *ground* war begins I think that it will have to involve a NK ground offensive (it seems pretty unlikely to me that US strikes on their nuclear capability would necessarily or likely be followed up by a US ground attack). If an NK ground offensice emerges, I think that
1. Seoul and nearby areas will fall.
2. Less than half the NK army will survive the retreat back into the north, and that half will itself be in pieces. But the NKs know that.
I think the scariest scenario might be the "trade missiles" outcome. In that case, even conventional weapons could cause horrific civilian casualties in places like Seoul. Even then the NKs will eventually be crushed (you cannot win a fight like that w/the US: our firepower is simply too great).
I am less afraid of the tunnels. In the end they are fixed fortifications, which as Patton pointed out are a monument to the stupidity of man. The only time tunnels ever gave the US serious problems was in Vietnam, but that was a whole different story (the tunnels were more rudimentary but also more dynamic; they were used to support guerilla operations, etc.).
I truly believe that the NKs, and virtually any other conventional traditional positional army, cannot answer the awesome array of offensive tools the US military possesses. For instance, I think that these tunnels are more vulnerable to things like special ops forces than you realize.
My fear remains those poor people in Seoul. Take that consideration away, and I would indeed entertain the idea of just taking these people (the NK regime) out. But I really fear for the people in places like Seoul: they will be the first pawn (ie military pawn) sacrificed in a fight. God have mercy on those people, b/c NK won't and we will not be able to help them initially.
I've read a bit about those tunnels. They are pretty amazing.
Nonetheless, I think that a purely defensive war for NK is unlikely: if a *ground* war begins I think that it will have to involve a NK ground offensive (it seems pretty unlikely to me that US strikes on their nuclear capability would necessarily or likely be followed up by a US ground attack). If an NK ground offensice emerges, I think that
1. Seoul and nearby areas will fall.
2. Less than half the NK army will survive the retreat back into the north, and that half will itself be in pieces. But the NKs know that.
I think the scariest scenario might be the "trade missiles" outcome. In that case, even conventional weapons could cause horrific civilian casualties in places like Seoul. Even then the NKs will eventually be crushed (you cannot win a fight like that w/the US: our firepower is simply too great).
I am less afraid of the tunnels. In the end they are fixed fortifications, which as Patton pointed out are a monument to the stupidity of man. The only time tunnels ever gave the US serious problems was in Vietnam, but that was a whole different story (the tunnels were more rudimentary but also more dynamic; they were used to support guerilla operations, etc.).
I truly believe that the NKs, and virtually any other conventional traditional positional army, cannot answer the awesome array of offensive tools the US military possesses. For instance, I think that these tunnels are more vulnerable to things like special ops forces than you realize.
My fear remains those poor people in Seoul. Take that consideration away, and I would indeed entertain the idea of just taking these people (the NK regime) out. But I really fear for the people in places like Seoul: they will be the first pawn (ie military pawn) sacrificed in a fight. God have mercy on those people, b/c NK won't and we will not be able to help them initially.
Peter, I share your view of NK ground offensive outcomes. In all the war games I played, I could never defend Seoul. The best I could do was halt and grind around the waistline while the reforcement started trickling in and air power parallized their supply lines. From that point on, it's downhill for NK and they would have had to start withdrawl as soon as the forward momentum stopped to get even 1/2 back across the 38th parallel line.
Re tunnels and special ops, I don't know enough about the latest special ops capabilities to comment. Is this the new Quake/Unreal-trained warriors? ;-)
Re tunnels and special ops, I don't know enough about the latest special ops capabilities to comment. Is this the new Quake/Unreal-trained warriors? ;-)
I was referring to the real life Spec Ops. They will be able to do allot by direct demolition action and air strike guidance.
The trouble with tunnels like the NKs have is that once you use them as an instrument of battle you start rapidly giving away key pieces of info about them. One of the reasons I fear for Seoul is that the NKs could use the tunnels as a vehicle for projecting their forces over the border. But having done that they will have revealed too much: in retreat they will be able to use the tunnels much less than was the case on the offensive.
You do realize, of course, that there is one option that could buy Seoul and surrounding population centers some precious time: battlefield nuclear weapons. There would still be allot of lossess to NK missiles. But I don't think those will be as bad as would be the case if the NK army can enter Seoul.
The worst part of all is that, by my estimation, Seoul provbably needs just extra 1-2 weeks. At that point, US airpower will have already degraded the NK military to the point where forward advance is no longer feasible.
BTW, another factor with regard to NKs tunnels is that my undertanding is that they are extensive, but concentrated around the strtegic principal of projecting large masses of NK forces close to the border unprotected, and for at least a short while providing the NK supply train with a degree of respite from relentless US bombardment. However, this ignores a likely US move in the event of war: a whole series of amphibious assaults (akin to the turning maneuver MacArthur pulled at Inchon) to get small, highly lethal and mobile MEUs into the NK rear. NK has no answer for that, and they will very rapidly begin to disrupt the feeder points for the tunnels from behind.
But the thought of war is staggering. i would not be surprised if 1-3 million S. Korean civilians were killed and 3-7 million were wounded. The worst case scenarios are even higher. These figures may seem high at first glance, but remember how densely concentrated and exposed the S. Korean population is. There is a real possibility that 1 in 4 NK civilians will become casualties (it depends on whether those bastards decide to try the "retreat to the population centers and try to turn it into Stalingrad" defense). And the worst part of all is that it will all have been in vain in the military sense: the terror inflicted on civilians will not change the basic, and hopeless, military equation NK is facing. Ugh.
The trouble with tunnels like the NKs have is that once you use them as an instrument of battle you start rapidly giving away key pieces of info about them. One of the reasons I fear for Seoul is that the NKs could use the tunnels as a vehicle for projecting their forces over the border. But having done that they will have revealed too much: in retreat they will be able to use the tunnels much less than was the case on the offensive.
You do realize, of course, that there is one option that could buy Seoul and surrounding population centers some precious time: battlefield nuclear weapons. There would still be allot of lossess to NK missiles. But I don't think those will be as bad as would be the case if the NK army can enter Seoul.
The worst part of all is that, by my estimation, Seoul provbably needs just extra 1-2 weeks. At that point, US airpower will have already degraded the NK military to the point where forward advance is no longer feasible.
BTW, another factor with regard to NKs tunnels is that my undertanding is that they are extensive, but concentrated around the strtegic principal of projecting large masses of NK forces close to the border unprotected, and for at least a short while providing the NK supply train with a degree of respite from relentless US bombardment. However, this ignores a likely US move in the event of war: a whole series of amphibious assaults (akin to the turning maneuver MacArthur pulled at Inchon) to get small, highly lethal and mobile MEUs into the NK rear. NK has no answer for that, and they will very rapidly begin to disrupt the feeder points for the tunnels from behind.
But the thought of war is staggering. i would not be surprised if 1-3 million S. Korean civilians were killed and 3-7 million were wounded. The worst case scenarios are even higher. These figures may seem high at first glance, but remember how densely concentrated and exposed the S. Korean population is. There is a real possibility that 1 in 4 NK civilians will become casualties (it depends on whether those bastards decide to try the "retreat to the population centers and try to turn it into Stalingrad" defense). And the worst part of all is that it will all have been in vain in the military sense: the terror inflicted on civilians will not change the basic, and hopeless, military equation NK is facing. Ugh.
Ugh is about right. Yes, I expect the millions will die as well.
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